Funkmasterr wrote:Zaelath wrote:l2read
I am completely capable of comprehending what I am reading. However, if I am misinterpreting what you were trying to say, you did not explain yourself well enough. I don't have the time or patience to read into what you are saying, I take everything here at face value.
Not to mention, instead of being a prick about it (I know this is a stretch for you), how about when someone misses your point you fucking explain yourself? I know it's tough.
I think his point was that this won't actually do anything to make you "safer". It's just "
Security Theater"; countermeasures that provide the feeling of security while doing little or nothing actually to improve security. That, coupled with the fact that the information collected could be used in a way that infringes on your privacy, makes it a
bad thing in Zaelath's opinion. At least that's how I was reading what he's written. You implied that he doesn't think people should need to show ID to get on a plane; he was saying that it doesn't provide you any extra security. Zaelath feel free to correct me if I'm wrong.
I've recommended Bruce Schneier's thoughts on airport security before, but I'll link them again if you haven't read them. I would hazard a guess that Zaelath has, and if you'd like to see a well-written piece on what "Airport Security" is really doing for us, I
highly recommend it.
The article can be found here. If it's too long to read in its entirety, I would definitely recommend at least reading the
Airline Security Regulations and
Protecting Privacy and Liberty sections. If you're unwilling or unable to read the article, some of the salient points are below.
Bruce Schneier wrote:Parked cars now must be 300 feet from airport gates. Why? What security problem does this solve? Why doesn't the same problem imply that passenger drop-off and pick-up should also be that far away? Curbside check-in has been eliminated. What's the threat that this security measure has solved? Why, if the new threat is hijacking, are we suddenly worried about bombs?
The rule limiting concourse access to ticketed passengers is another one that confuses me. What exactly is the threat here? Hijackers have to be on the planes they're trying to hijack to carry out their attack, so they have to have tickets. And anyone can call Priceline.com and "name their own price" for concourse access.
Increased inspections -- of luggage, airplanes, airports -- seem like a good idea, although it's far from perfect. The biggest problem here is that the inspectors are poorly paid and, for the most part, poorly educated and trained. Other problems include the myriad ways to bypass the checkpoints -- numerous studies have found all sorts of violations -- and the impossibility of effectively inspecting everybody while maintaining the required throughput. Unidentified armed guards on select flights is another mildly effective idea: it's a small deterrent, because you never know if one is on the flight you want to hijack.
Positive bag matching -- ensuring that a piece of luggage does not get loaded on the plane unless its owner boards the plane -- is actually a good security measure, but assumes that bombers have self-preservation as a guiding force. It is completely useless against suicide bombers.
The worst security measure of them all is the photo ID requirement. This solves no security problem I can think of. It doesn't even identify people; any high school student can tell you how to get a fake ID. The requirement for this invasive and ineffective security measure is secret; the FAA won't send you the written regulations if you ask. Airlines are actually more stringent about this than the FAA requires, because the "security" measure solves a business problem for them.
The real point of photo ID requirements is to prevent people from reselling tickets. Nonrefundable tickets used to be regularly advertised in the newspaper classifieds. Ads would read something like "Round trip, Boston to Chicago, 11/22 - 11/30, female, $50." Since the airlines didn't check ID but could notice gender, any female could buy the ticket and fly the route. Now this doesn't work. The airlines love this; they solved a problem of theirs, and got to blame the solution on FAA security requirements.
Airline security measures are primarily designed to give the appearance of good security rather than the actuality. This makes sense, once you realize that the airlines' goal isn't so much to make the planes hard to hijack, as to make the passengers willing to fly. Of course airlines would prefer it if all their flights were perfectly safe, but actual hijackings and bombings are rare events and they know it.
This is not to say that all airport security is useless, and that we'd be better off doing nothing. All security measures have benefits, and all have costs: money, inconvenience, etc. I would like to see some rational analysis of the costs and benefits, so we can get the most security for the resources we have.
One basic snake-oil warning sign is the use of self-invented security measures, instead of expert-analyzed and time-tested ones. The closest the airlines have to experienced and expert analysis is El Al. Since 1948 they have been operating in and out of the most heavily terroristic areas of the planet, with phenomenal success. They implement some pretty heavy security measures. One thing they do is have reinforced, locked doors between their airplanes' cockpit and the passenger section. (Notice that this security measure is 1) expensive, and 2) not immediately perceptible to the passenger.) Another thing they do is place all cargo in decompression chambers before takeoff, to trigger bombs set to sense altitude. (Again, this is 1) expensive, and 2) imperceptible, so unattractive to American airlines.) Some of the things El Al does are so intrusive as to be unconstitutional in the U.S., but they let you take your pocketknife on board with you.
Why are we not already requiring the two measures that El Al takes that are listed above?? I think with just those two things in place, it'd be damn near impossible to hijack a plane.
Bruce Schneier wrote:Security and privacy are not two sides of a teeter-totter. This association is simplistic and largely fallacious. It's easy and fast, but less effective, to increase security by taking away liberty. However, the best ways to increase security are not at the expense of privacy and liberty.
It's easy to refute the notion that all security comes at the expense of liberty. Arming pilots, reinforcing cockpit doors, and teaching flight attendants karate are all examples of security measures that have no effect on individual privacy or liberties. So are better authentication of airport maintenance workers, or dead-man switches that force planes to automatically land at the closest airport, or armed air marshals traveling on flights.
Liberty-depriving security measures are most often found when system designers failed to take security into account from the beginning. They're Band-aids, and evidence of bad security planning. When security is designed into a system, it can work without forcing people to give up their freedoms.
