The counter-point to that post would be this one filed 2 days earlier...Let's Check the Track Records
July 23, 2006: Hizbollah's rocket offensive is faltering. While up to a hundred rockets were launched into northern Israel on some days last week, the number has fallen to about 40 a day. Fewer of them are the longer range (up to 40 kilometers, or more). Most are the 122mm rockets, with a range of about 20 kilometers. These have shut down most economic activity in many parts of northern Israel, and killed or injured over a hundred Israelis. This has caused some 80 percent of Israeli voters to back the operations against Lebanon.
Israel's Northern Command can mobilize over 180,000 troops. The Lebanese army has only 70,000 soldiers, so a battle with the Lebanese army is unlikely, despite Lebanese promises to send troops to the assistance of Hizbollah. In addition to its guerrilla fighters, Hizbollah has a couple of brigades armed and trained for conventional operations. These may be the best trained "regular" troops in the region, barring those that Israel isn't likely to fight (Jordan, Egypt, Turkey), and it's believed that Hizbollah hopes that they could take on Israeli troops in a conventional battle. To that end, sending Israeli ground forces into southern Lebanon is intended to draw Hizbollah's conventional forces out, in anticipation of an invasion. In that way, Hizbollah might lay its conventional forces open to air and artillery attack, and probably selective ground and commando action.
The Lebanese Christians are probably more enthusiastic about fighting Hizbollah, than Israelis, and the Sunnis probably not much less so. But Israel has to be careful to avoid open clashed with Lebanese regular troops. Israel has always maintained communication with the various factions in Lebanon, either directly (as with the Christians) or indirectly. In this way, discussions, sometimes heated, have taken place over what to do with Hizbollah. It breaks down like this. To most Lebanese, the Shia (about 35 percent of the population), sold out to foreigners (Syria and Iran) in order to increase Shia power in Lebanon. The Shia had long constituted the poorest segment of Lebanese society, but this has changed since Syrian troops moved in during the 1980s, and assisted in the establishment of Hizbollah. This turned the Lebanese civil war (which began in 1975) into a deadlock, and led to a peace deal in 1990. But that didn't end the civil war, it just brought about a cease fire. The Christian and Sunni majority put up with the Syrian occupation of the country until last year, when a popular uprising led to the Syrian withdrawal of their troops. But Hizbollah, which was supposed to disarm as part of the 1990 "peace" deal, continued to control the southern third of the country. Worse, many in Hizbollah, inspired by their Iranian patrons, talked about how great it would be if all of Lebanon were an Islamic republic, just like Iran.
Many Lebanese see the Hizbollah attack on Israel as a way for the Lebanese Shia to avoid a resumption of the civil war, over the disarmament of Hizbollah. Lebanese Shia remember what it was like to be at the bottom of the economic and social pecking order, and don't want to return to the bad old days. Hizbollah (which got over $100 million a year from Iran) brought lots of jobs, as did the Syrian army of occupation. The Lebanese Shia see all that slipping away. By causing a war with Israel, the Lebanese Shia see an opportunity to unite all Lebanese behind them. Unfortunately, the Christian and Sunni Lebanese, while angry with the Israeli air campaign, are not enthusiastic about dying to maintain Hizbollah power. Israeli negotiations with the Lebanese agree on one thing; Hizbollah has to go. Lebanon cannot be free as long as Hizbollah maintains its own army, and controls a third of the country. The expulsion of the Syrian army last year was wildly popular, except among the Shia. The Israelis are waiting for public opinion among the Lebanese Christians and Sunnis to go against Hizbollah. This is why there has been no large scale movement of Israeli troops into southern Lebanon. Small units (no more than battalion strength, under a thousand troops) are going in to destroy Hizbollah bunker complexes that cannon be destroyed from the air.
To that end, Israeli orders for American deep penetrators (bunker buster bombs) have been speeded up, and those bombs are being delivered now. Israel already had several hundred of the GBU-24 penetrators, but last year ordered a hundred of the larger (2.5 ton) GBU-28. The GBU-28 can penetrate 100 feet of earth, or 20 feet of concrete. The lighter GBU-24 can manage less than half that.
Israel has watched (from the air, and via spies on the ground) as Hizbollah used lots of its Iranian money to build underground bunkers in the areas of southern Lebanon that Israel withdrew from in 2000. Hizbollah knew about the capabilities of the GBU-24 and 28, and built accordingly. That doesn't make the Hizbollah bunkers invulnerable. The entrances can be destroyed, and if you can get all the access tunnels, you turn the bunker into a tomb. But with some of the bunkers, not all the access tunnels were known. There's only so much that spies and air reconnaissance will tell you. However, the Israelis have had over six years to plan for this sort of operation. Based on past performance, you can expect some clever ideas. It's not smart to underestimate the Israelis. For example, Israel shut down the Palestinian terrorists over the last few years. The pundits had declared this to be impossible. So was the Six Day war, and the creation of Israel itself. So, before you pick a probable outcome here, check the track records of the contenders. On the other side, you have radical Islam, which has accomplished very little. Terror is the tactic of the weak, or those short of better ideas. The Palestinian leadership has a long record of bad decisions and inept performance. Hizbollah succeeded via powerful backers (Iranian cash and the Syrian army). Now the Syrians are gone, and Hizbollah is caught between angry Israelis, and Lebanese fans, most of whom (the Christians and Sunnis) are cheering on Hizbollah through clenched teeth and forced smiles. Most Lebanese are content to see Hizbollah and Israel fight it out. But the Israeli war plan recognizes that, without some cooperation from the Lebanese Christians and Sunnis, Hizbollah will just keep it up. The Lebanese have to decide if they want a future with, or without, Hizbollah. While the Lebanese media speaks of Lebanese unity against Israeli aggression, private discussions in northern Lebanon are more about how to make the most of this opportunity to eliminate Hizbollah.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htwin/ ... 60721.aspx
Like the old X-Files promo... the truth is out there (unless you're too stupidly liberal/progressive/cranius rectumitis [Nick] to see it.)Hizbollahs Clever Plan for Victory
July 21, 2006: Hizbollah appears to have a lot of confidence in their ability to use Information War techniques to foil any Israeli attempt to defeat them. While the Israelis have overwhelming military superiority, Hizbollah has some serious assets of its own. For example;
Hizbollah has the support of the Shia Arab population in Lebanon. Shia comprise about 35 percent of Lebanese. While there are other Shia factions, Hizbollah has the most street cred. That's because Hizbollah got declared the victor (in Arab minds) when Israel withdrew from their south Lebanon security zone (to prevent Hizbollah rockets from threatening northern Israel) in 2000. Israel left because the constant skirmishing with Hizbollah was getting a few Israeli soldiers killed each year, and this was becoming politically unacceptable within Israel. So the UN brokered a deal for the Israeli withdrawal. But Hizbollah declared the withdrawal a military victory over Israel. This made Hizbollah heroes in the eyes of Lebanese Shia, and other Arabs in general.
While part of that 2000 deal for Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon included the Lebanese army taking control of the border, Hizbollah kept control of southern Lebanon for itself. Hizbollah is safe in the knowledge that the rest of the world will forget that part of the deal. The other Lebanese were not happy with Hizbollah retaining control of southern Lebanon, but did not want to start another civil war by trying to disarm Hizbollah (another part of the UN withdrawal deal that was ignored and forgotten, by everyone except Israel.)
Therefore, Hizbollah can always hide among the Lebanese Shia population, which is willing to protect, or at least hide, their heroes. That might not work, because there are only 3.8 million Lebanese, and only 1.3 million Shia. But Hizbollah has other allies outside the country.
In addition to it's major sponsor, Iran, Hizbollah can also rely on Syria (run by a Shia minority, and propped up by Iran). But Hizbollah's biggest ally is world media, European public opinion, and Hizbollah's ability to portray itself as the victim. While Hizbollah has made no secret of its goal of destroying Israel (as has Iran), Hizbollah has cleverly set up its defenses in southern Lebanon so as to maximize civilian casualties if Israel ever attacked. For example, when thousands of rockets were brought in from Iran (via Syria) over the last six years, they were stored in special rooms or basements in schools, Mosques and homes. Civilians were given no choice in this matter, and many Shia in the south were proud to help house weapons to be used against Israel. Fewer of these civilians were willing to get killed when Israeli bombs or artillery shells came to destroy these rockets. Israel knew what Hizbollah was doing, and that's why Israel did not go after the rockets until now. To bomb the rocket supplies would have killed civilians, and without a Hizbollah attack on Israel, the PR and diplomatic backlash would have made such attacks too costly.
But Hizbollah is calculating that enough dead Lebanese civilians will cause European nations, and even the UN, to lean on Israel (perhaps even an embargo) and force a halt to the bombings. Hizbollah could even halt its rocket attacks, for a while anyway, and declare another victory. The two captured Israeli soldiers would never be surrendered except for hundreds of imprisoned terrorists. If Hizbollah gets enough world public opinion on their side, even this proposed trade will be seen as "reasonable", and Israel will be condemned for refusing to go along.
Hizbollah does have some risk exposure. For example, Israel could get lucky, (or Hizbollah gets sloppy), find where the two captured soldiers are, and rescue them. Israel could also reestablish their security zone, and convince the Lebanese government that they could only get that back if the Lebanese army came in and replaced Hizbollah. The Lebanese could pull that off, by promising (secretly) Hizbollah that they could return and continue to operate against Israel.
The Lebanese are also villains in all of this, as it was their unwillingness to disarm Hizbollah, and take charge of the border, in violation of the UN agreement, that made it possible for Hizbollah to attack Israel. The UN is also at fault, for not doing anything in six years to see that the 2000 agreement was carried out. Hizbollah knows they are not going to destroy Israel this time around, but are pretty much assured of another propaganda victory.
The UN is talking about sending in peacekeepers, but they have had several thousand peacekeepers along the border for decades. The problem is that the peacekeepers have no authority to do anything about Hizbollah, or any other terrorists. It's unlikely that any nation would be willing to supply peacekeepers for a force that could go after Hizbollah. That would be a nasty fight, with all manner of bad publicity. Everyone knows Hizbollah is good at spinning the media, and doesn't want to be on the wrong end of such spin.
So, despite the moral, military and intelligence advantages of Israel, Hizbollah is confident that growing European anti-Semitism (and anti-Israeli attitudes), media willingness to portray Hizbollah as a victim, and Lebanese unwillingness to do anything that would risk another civil war (the last went from 1975 to 1990), they can survive anything the Israelis throw at them, and come out a winner (in the minds of Arabs, at the very least).
